Are Many Worlds and the Multiverse the Same Idea?

When physicists are asked about “parallel worlds” or ideas along those lines, they have to be careful to distinguish among different interpretations of that idea. There is the “multiverse” of inflationary cosmology, the “many worlds” or “branches of the wave function” of quantum mechanics, and “parallel branes” of string theory. Increasingly, however, people are wondering whether the first two concepts might actually represent the same underlying idea. (I think the branes are still a truly distinct notion.)

At first blush it seems crazy — or at least that was my own initial reaction. When cosmologists talk about “the multiverse,” it’s a slightly poetic term. We really just mean different regions of spacetime, far away so that we can’t observe them, but nevertheless still part of what one might reasonably want to call “the universe.” In inflationary cosmology, however, these different regions can be relatively self-contained — “pocket universes,” as Alan Guth calls them. When you combine this with string theory, the emergent local laws of physics in the different pocket universes can be very different; they can have different particles, different forces, even different numbers of dimensions. So there is a good reason to think about them as separate universes, even if they’re all part of the same underlying spacetime.

The situation in quantum mechanics is superficially entirely different. Think of Schrödinger’s Cat. Quantum mechanics describes reality in terms of wave functions, which assign numbers (amplitudes) to all the various possibilities of what we can see when we make an observation. The cat is neither alive nor dead; it is in a superposition of alive + dead. At least, until we observe it. In the simplistic Copenhagen interpretation, at the moment of observation the wave function “collapses” onto one actual possibility. We see either an alive cat or a dead cat; the other possibility has simply ceased to exist. In the Many Worlds or Everett interpretation, both possibilities continue to exist, but “we” (the macroscopic observers) are split into two, one that observes a live cat and one that observes a dead one. There are now two of us, both equally real, never to come back into contact.

These two ideas sound utterly different. In the cosmological multiverse, the other universes are simply far away; in quantum mechanics, they’re right here, but in different possibility spaces (i.e. different parts of Hilbert space, if you want to get technical). But some physicists have been musing for a while that they might actually be the same, and now there are a couple of new papers by brave thinkers from the Bay Area that make this idea explicit.

Physical Theories, Eternal Inflation, and Quantum Universe, Yasunori Nomura

The Multiverse Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Raphael Bousso and Leonard Susskind

Related ideas have been discussed recently under the rubric of “how to do quantum mechanics in an infinitely big universe”; see papers by Don Page and another by Anthony Aguirre, David Layzer, and Max Tegmark. But these two new ones go explicitly for the “multiverse = many-worlds” theme.

After reading these papers I’ve gone from a confused skeptic to a tentative believer. This happened for a very common reason: I realized that these ideas fit very well with other ideas I’ve been thinking about myself! So I’m going to try to explain a bit about what is going on. However, for better or for worse, my interpretation of these papers is strongly colored by my own ideas. So I’m going to explain what I think has a chance of being true; I believe it’s pretty close to what is being proposed in these papers, but don’t hold the authors responsible for anything silly that I end up saying.

There are two ideas that fit together to make this crazy-sounding proposal into something sensible. The first is quantum vacuum decay.

When particle physicists say “vacuum,” they don’t mean “empty space,” they mean “a state of a theory that has the lowest energy of all similar-looking states.” So let’s say you have some scalar field filling the universe that can take on different values, and each different value has a different potential energy associated with it. In the course of normal evolution the field wants to settle down to a minimum of its potential energy — that’s a “vacuum.” But there can be the “true vacuum,” where the energy is really the lowest, and all sorts of “false vacua,” where you’re in a local minimum but not really a global minimum.

The fate of the false vacuum was worked out in a series of famous papers by Sidney Coleman and collaborators in the 1970’s. Short version of the story: fields are subject to quantum fluctuations. So the scalar field doesn’t just sit there in its vacuum state; if you observe it, you might find it straying away a little bit. Eventually it strays so far that it climbs right over the barrier in the direction of the true vacuum. That doesn’t happen everywhere in space all at once; it just happens in one tiny region — a “bubble.” But once it happens, the field really wants to be in the true vacuum rather than the false one — it’s energetically favorable. So the bubble grows. Other bubbles form elsewhere and also grow. Eventually all the bubbles crash into each other, and you successfully complete a transition from the false vacuum to the true one. (Unless the universe expands so fast that the bubbles never reach each other.) It’s really a lot like water turning to steam through the formation of bubbles.

This is how everyone talks about the fate of the false vacuum, but it’s not what really happens. Quantum fields don’t really “fluctuate”; that’s poetic language, employed to help us connect to our classical intuition. What fluctuates are our observations — we can look at the same field multiple times and measure different values.

Likewise, when we say “a bubble forms and grows,” that’s not exactly right. What really happens is that there is a quantum amplitude for a bubble to exist, and that amplitude grows with time. When we look at the field, we see a bubble or we don’t, just like when we open Schrödinger’s box we see either a live cat or a dead cat. But really there is a quantum wave function that describes all the possibilities at once.

Keep that in mind, and now let’s introduce the second key ingredient: horizon complementarity.

The idea of horizon complementarity is a generalization of the idea of black hole complementarity, which in turn is a play on the idea of quantum complementarity. (Confused yet?) Complementarity was introduced by Niels Bohr, as a way of basically saying “you can think of an electron as a particle, or as a wave, but not as both at the same time.” That is, there are different but equally valid ways of describing something, but ways that you can’t invoke simultaneously.

For black holes, complementarity was taken to roughly mean “you can talk about what’s going on inside the black hole, or outside, but not both at the same time.” It is a way of escaping the paradox of information loss as black holes evaporate. You throw a book into a black hole, and if information is not lost you should (in principle!) be able to reconstruct what was in the book by collecting all of the Hawking radiation into which the black hole evaporates. That sounds plausible even if you don’t know exactly the mechanism by which happens. The problem is, you can draw a “slice” through spacetime that contains both the infalling book and the outgoing radiation! So where is the information really? (It’s not in both places at once — that’s forbidden by the no-cloning theorem.)

Susskind, Thorlacius, and Uglum, as well as Gerard ‘t Hooft, suggested complementarity as the solution: you can either talk about the book falling into the singularity inside the black hole, or you can talk about the Hawking radiation outside, but you can’t talk about both at once. It seems like a bit of wishful thinking to save physics from the unpalatable prospect of information being lost as black holes evaporate, but as theorists thought more and more about how black holes work, evidence accumulated that something like complementarity is really true. (See for example.)

According to black hole complementarity, someone outside the black hole shouldn’t think about what’s inside; more specifically, everything that is happening inside can be “encoded” as information on the event horizon itself. This idea works very well with holography, and the fact that the entropy of the black hole is proportional to the area of the horizon rather than the volume of what’s inside. Basically you are replacing “inside the black hole” with “information living on the horizon.” (Or really the “stretched horizon,” just outside the real horizon. This connects with the membrane paradigm for black hole physics, but this blog post is already way too long as it is.)

Event horizons aren’t the only kind of horizons in general relativity; there are also horizons in cosmology. The difference is that we can stand outside the black hole, while we are inside the universe. So the cosmological horizon is a sphere that surrounds us; it’s the point past which things are so far away that light signals from them don’t have time to reach us.


So then we have horizon complementarity: you can talk about what’s inside your cosmological horizon, but not what’s outside. Rather, everything that you think might be going on outside can be encoded in the form of information on the horizon itself, just like for black holes! This becomes a fairly sharp and believable statement in empty space with a cosmological constant (de Sitter space), where there is even an exact analogue of Hawking radiation. But horizon complementarity says that it’s true more generally.

So, all those pocket universes that cosmologists talk about? Nonsense, say the complementarians. Or at least, you shouldn’t take them literally; all you should ever talk about at once is what happens inside (and on) your own horizon. That’s a finite amount of stuff, not an infinitely big multiverse. As you might imagine, this perspective has very deep consequences for cosmological predictions, and the debate about how to make it all fit together is raging within the community. (I’m helping to organize a big meeting about it this summer at Perimeter.)

Okay, now let’s put the two ideas together: horizon complementarity (“only think about what’s inside your observable universe”) and quantum vacuum decay (“at any point in space you are in a quantum superposition of different vacuum states”).

The result is: multiverse-in-a-box. Or at least, multiverse-in-an-horizon. On the one hand, complementarity says that we shouldn’t think about what’s outside our observable universe; every question that it is sensible to ask can be answered in terms of what’s happening inside a single horizon. On the other, quantum mechanics says that a complete description of what’s actually inside our observable universe includes an amplitude for being in various possible states. So we’ve replaced the cosmological multiverse, where different states are located in widely separated regions of spacetime, with a localized multiverse, where the different states are all right here, just in different branches of the wave function.

That’s a lot to swallow, but hopefully the basics are clear. So: is it true? And if so, what can we do with it?

Obviously we don’t yet know the answer to either question, but it’s exciting to think about. I’m kind of inclined to think that it has a good chance of actually being true. And if so, of course what I’d like to do is to ask what the consequences are for cosmological initial conditions and the arrow of time. I certainly don’t think this perspective provides an easy answer to those questions, but it might offer a relatively stable platform from which definite answers could be developed. It’s a very big universe, we should expect that understanding it will be a grand challenge.

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95 Responses to Are Many Worlds and the Multiverse the Same Idea?

  1. math says:

    Well obviously each observer is at the center of their universe.

  2. Alan says:

    Fascinating and thanks for the article. But does this make things more complicated or less!

  3. Pingback: Cosmological Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics « Not Even Wrong

  4. Dean Robinson says:

    The problem I have with these concepts is, where does the energy, or mass, come from to create a duplicate universe when “we” (the macroscopic observers) are split into two”.

  5. Matthew Saunders says:

    Beautiful riff, Sean 🙂 Are you still gobsmacked at all the stuff you write, which was once considered fringe and crazy, is now so different? 🙂

    The first time I ever considered the multiverse concept was from Michael Moorcock’s Elric series…he used the term a lot 🙂 So, when I finally heard a scientist say it, I giggled. And I find it funny that, between the multiverse and telology, scientists would choose the multiverse 🙂

  6. Cliff says:

    Nice post.

    One question thats tugged at me for quite some time, and I may as well ask it here:

    It surprises me that whenever the black hole information paradox is brought up, the explanation always seems to run afoul of the solution actually offered by Hawking himself (hep-th/0507171). He says that if you have a black hole and you throw a book into it, the information IS lost, but this does not violate unitarity because if you know for sure that a black hole exists then you are already in a highly mixed quantum state. He says that when the problem is properly formulated in semiclassical quantum gravity, the S-matrix elements have contributions from topologically trivial, information-preserving metrics, as well as topologically nontrivial metrics (i.e. black holes) that do destroy information. At asymptotically late times only, the trivial topologies actually contribute, and thus unitarity is preserved.

    I don’t consider myself enough of an expert to have a strong opinion on this, but I feel I know enough to regard this solution as highly appealing and plausible. Is there any particular reason why I almost never hear this insight discussed? It seems strange to invoke Hawkings name to answer a question that contradicts the answer that he himself offered.

  7. Mike says:

    Thanks for this Sean. I take the QM MWI to be true for a variety of reasons that I know a little about. It’s interesting to read how this may be related to Susskind and Bousso’s approach which I know very little about.

  8. Mason says:

    I noticed that you refered to the Copenhagen interpretation as “simplistic.” Are you suggesting that it is a bad interpretation? Or better yet, which interpretation is the best supported by experimental data?

    Questions aside, great blog post! I always enjoy your posts!

  9. Roger says:


  10. POTU says:

    I don’t follow how the quantum many-worlds are the same as inflationary cosmology’s pocket universes. It seems that they are separate ideas that can co-exist, which means that the universe is really big in more ways that one!

  11. Liberalism's A Sickness says:

    Whenever I read these astonishingly absurd cosmological theories from the “scientific” community, I am reminded of what GK Chesterton said, “When people stop believing in God, they don’t believe in nothing – they believe in anything.” This guy is so over the top, it’s just plain hilarious.

    Curiously enough, the very same people who categorically reject the relatively benign notion of a God, or even Itelligent Design for that matter, are the very same peoole who believe total crap, most of which which is infinitely less believable and equally less provable. And they have this equally silly notion that because they hold this or that science degree that their insane ideas are somehow less suspect than those of people who believe in God. Just think of all the scientifically unverifiable “beliefs” they have right out of the chute in order to come to the absurd conclusions they come to – and all under the guise of scientific inquiry!

  12. Matthew Saunders says:

    #11: They deal with the fruits that are given them, trying to invent as little fruits as possible, but where needed 🙂 The unknowable is unknowable and remains there to inspire and pull at all of us to want to grok with fullness, eventually 🙂 And search for the perfect bean salad, of course.

  13. QUestionmark says:

    Would splitting still occur as in standard MWI or would these worlds always be seperate in the wavefunction?

  14. KWK says:

    I might be missing something here, but doesn’t the possibility of encoding information external to our universe onto our horizon mean that information from a possible multiverse would, in fact, be observable? I had thought that the existence of the multiverse was primarily motivated mathematically, and therefore (arguably) an appealing inference for what the laws of physics had actually brought about, but was in any case unobservable even in principle.
    But if observations can (again, in principle) be made regarding areas outside our horizon, how does this information get onto our horizon, since any external universes would (effectively) be infinitely far away? Would the wavefunction associated with such universes really extend to/impinge upon our own?

  15. Matt says:

    Ah, the reason Peter disappeared in the season finale of ‘Fringe’ while the bridge remained is: Peter fading out was a rather poetic expression that there was information leakage from a localized multiverse horizon. This leakage was from a universe where Peter was to others where he was not .

    A concert of quantum events orchestrated by Peter in the machine thus created the bridge on Liberty Island in a manner analogous to Hawking radiation surrounding a black hole’s event horizon resulting in a signal in Morse code.

    So the universe(s) where Peter existed were specifically engineered (by the Observers) to make a machine that could effect other universes at a quantum level. And to create Peter so that he could use the machine to create the bridge.

  16. Geoff N says:

    @Liberalism… your argument seems to be that since neither religion/god nor the multiverse has any evidence to support them, however religion is correct. Brilliant. Thanks for the insight.

  17. David George says:

    I recall reading somewhere that there is a reason why Everett’s name is first on the “many worlds” interpretation. It isn’t very illuminating. The superimposed live-dead cat arises because there is no model of a spatially extended electron that explains the statistics, while the wave function as a statistical ensemble does explain the statistics. When there is a model of a spatially extended electron, the superimposed live-dead cat will disappear. Then the many worlds interpretation will disappear, then the multiverse will disappear, then inflation will disappear, the past creation moment (Big Bang) will disappear, etc.

  18. Kevin says:

    #11: Hypotheses are different from theories. Also, see #16’s comment.

  19. WWarren says:

    “many worlds” and “the multiverse”..might ‘compute differently’


    …is ‘absoloutely “nothing”‘ computable?

    A many worlds approach…(a many worlds computable system)…says ok…let one set of worlds be
    computable…the others “crash the system”…lets just remove the ones that cause a problem..that
    is the same way Grigory Perelman solved his problem…”cut out what you don’t like…reattach the
    rest”. Computer Science does that all the time…called “crash recovery data mining”…you can
    literally program a watch for “problem events”..and shut everything down before
    anything really nasty happens.

    A multiverse however…needs its ‘complete network working well’ (at least at first.)

    Sean in your paper <– ( see on page 30 ) you wrote

    "…the perturbations require an additional substantial fine tuning…." <–next to last

    This seems like more evidence for 'intelligent design'.

    Genesis 1:1 again anyone?


  20. Matthew Saunders says:

    #19: Sure, John Wheeler’s ‘Participatory universe’ 🙂 universe comes into being, observers come from universe, observers bring universe into being, observers come from universe…no beginning, no end, no first matter, all interconnected…all that groks is G_d 🙂

  21. “Are Many Worlds and the Multiverse the Same Idea?”

    Well, there are some universes in which they are, and some in which the are not. 🙂

  22. Luke Barnes says:

    Great post! Is there any plan to publish proceedings or upload videos from the “Challenges for Early Universe Cosmology” conference/.

  23. Baby Bones says:

    You know those optical illusions of facial “death” masks, where someone looking at the concave inner surface sees a convex outer surface, or those illusions where the direction of spoke rotations alternate? Our eyes can’t view both images at once so we are faced with a dichotomy that is resolved as an optical illusion with the help of an extra piece of information (we can look a little closer or touch the object to make sure). The difference between such an optical illusion and a QM experiment is that there is usually no alternation in a QM experiment to reveal the illusion immediately (although some recent ones show superpositions directly) and the variables of QM are complementary in an exclusive way. That is, in the classical physics world we have recourse to a complementary variable such as the sense of touch to determining the true state even while the illusion tricks the eye, but QM forbids the use of other variables that could be complementary to measurement via the uncertainty principle.

  24. Pieter Kok says:

    Very nice post indeed.

    This may be due to Sean’s write-up, or with the original idea, but it seems to me that this idea works very well for the quantum superposition of vacuum states, but what about superpositions of other degrees of freedom that all sit happily in the same vacuum? So rather than the MWI and the multiverse being the same, isn’t it more accurate to say that the multiverse is a consequence of MWI and the existence of multiple vacua?

    PS. as a liberal I denounce corporal punishment in all cases but one: superposition jokes.

  25. ophu says:

    @”Liberalism is a disease”: The “null hypothesis” is traditionally used when an answer is unwanted.