244 | Katie Elliott on Metaphysics, Chance, and Time

/ Philosophy / 17 Comments

Is metaphysics like physics, but cooler? Or is it a relic of an outdated, pre-empirical way of thinking about the world? Closer to the former than the latter. Rather than building specific quantitative theories about the world, metaphysics aims to get a handle on the basic logical structures that help us think about it. I talk with philosopher Katie Elliott on how metaphysics helps us think about questions like counterfactuals, possible worlds, time travel, mathematical equivalence, and whether everything happens for a reason.

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Katrina (Katie) Elliott received her Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. After being an assistant professor of philosophy at UCLA, she is now on the faculty at Brandeis. Her research covers topics in metaphysics and the philosophy of science, including explanation, chances, and the logic of time travel.

17 thoughts on “244 | Katie Elliott on Metaphysics, Chance, and Time”

  1. Brian Whit

    sufficient reason for probability: when we get to the level of quantum, and a stochastic world, I want to believe in a relativistic ether, or a void that is just a base field beneath the Higgs field beneath the particle energy world–The reason its probability is that we are tapping into the sub-field where things are assembled into reality, that its a probabilistic universe because it all comes from the same vat.
    Or same field. Also, physics forbids projecting too far into the future, or too many phases or sequences. Probability exists at the smallest increment of time, or when it becomes a primary factor. (not smart or trained enough or patient enough to test anything I’m saying, but its fun to say. )

  2. JL

    Three points of clarification / mild frustration:

    In the example with the boxes, it doesn’t make sense to choose the clear box with the $100 if you have evidence that a long string of participants were paid by picking the million dollar box. Even if one wants to take the stance that only visible evidence counts, the fact that a bunch of people picked the opaque box and got a million dollars is visible evidence, no different than being able to see the $100 in the clear box. Nor does it make sense to discriminate between a given fact (lots of folks got the million) and what you see (the $100); if anything the visual could be a trick moreso than the fact (e.g. the $100 isn’t really there). Her choice isn’t rational unless she wants to say probability isn’t real.

    Re Calvinism: Was an actual Calvinist in my 20s, studied Calvinist theology in college (now an atheist). Calvinists believe that the elect are called to grace, meaning, all were dead in sin and God then made them alive by filling them with the Holy Spirit. Calvinists explicitly reject free will: If you are saved, it is because God actively decided to save you, like raising someone from the dead. So Calvinists aren’t a great example here, because God not only calls the Calvinist elect, he forces them to come; if you are one of the elect it’s like God is a salesman who sells you so convincingly you can’t say no, or, if you were dead and are now alive in Christ, you didn’t choose to be alive (the dead can’t choose anything) and now can’t choose to be un-alive. Romans 9 is pretty explicit about this: God is old school in wielding complete control over who goes to heaven or hell, not just forecasting ability.

    Re the grandfather paradox on a single timeline: argh!

    Look, if you went back into your own timeline by 50 years or whatever for even just ten minutes, and didn’t do anything but rode the bus from one stop to another, you would potentially change billions of people’s lives via sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Given the degree to each human is a random sperm-and-egg collision, you could have changed the birth outcomes of half the children to be born of people riding on the bus you got onto, which would then have cascading effects. Stepping into the past of your own timeline for even a brief period, and interacting with even one person in a low key way, could have so many frozen accident ripple effects at the micro-scale it would dramatically change the course of the global timeline. Time travel into your own timeline is logically impossible because not only would you mess up your own birth, you would change a whole strata of frozen accidents all acrosss the continuum moving forward. This seems obvious…

  3. ahd

    A quick comment on the relation between causality and the arrow of time.

    Statistical learning theory measures a model’s success by looking at out-of-sample error. If a mathematically definable mechanism governs the generation of the data being modeled (or theorized about) then considering a sufficient amount of data and a sufficiently expressive set space of possible models allows one to ‘learn’ the data generating model and correctly predict out-of-sample outcomes. One can say you’ve learned the theory of how the descriptive factors ’cause’ the outcomes. But there’s no mention of time here, only the concept of in- and out-of-sample.

    Introducing time allows us to define an experiment done after the theory is posited as out-of-sample and that’s why, to a physicist weaned on Special (or General) Relativity, time seems necessary to the concept of causality. But any untainted process for creating a truly out-of-sample test set is sufficient for showing causation – no time required.

  4. Jim Richardson

    One of the most fascinating and lively foundational discussions here yet. 10 thumbs up!

  5. Howard Gary

    Godel’s first incompleteness theorem proved that no consistent system of axions whose theorems can be listed by an effective procedure (i.e., an algorithm) is capable of proving all truths about the arithmetic of natural numbers. For any such consistent formal system, there will always be statements about natural numbers that are true, but that are unprovable within the system.

    In much the same manner it could be said there are true facts about the real world that cannot be proven using the scientific method. This is where, as stated in the intro to the podcast, metaphysics helps us think about questions.
    like possible worlds, time travel, and whether everything happens for a reason. Questions that do have an answer, whether or not we can ever know for certain what that answer is, but nevertheless we can’t help asking.

    “Curiosity is the essence of human existence … ”
    – Gene Cernan (1934-2017) American astronaut, and last person to walk on the Moon

  6. Alan

    A “metaphysics of science” is as difficult for me to imagine as a “spirituality of metabolism” or an “idealism of pragmatism”. To appreciate the differences, I compare the methods and thinking styles of metaphysicians and modern scientists. I compare the types of metaphors used (see “Philosophy in the Flesh” by Lakoff and Johnson). It’s also helpful to learn something of the history of the styles. Compare and contrast Parmenides and Plato with Protagoras. (Plato’s rendering of the war between the gods and the earth giants, understanding that he misrepresented the thinking of those that did not agree with him.) Steven L. Goldman gives a superb summary of the history of the opposed styles of thinking in his “Science Wars” lectures.

    Reifications of notions abstracted from nature, arbitrary distinctions, linear, and either/or thinking, and an avoidance of prediction and testing lead most people to a belief that knowledge of what exists must be universal, necessary, and certain. I’m unhappy that the preferred style of thinking has generated and maintained the ideologies of hierarchic, oppressive, bigoted, warring tribes. I prefer my notions of what exists to be particular (situated in space and time), contingent, and open to revision or replacement with new understandings.

  7. Howard Gary

    Two interesting takes on Newcomb’s parados. KE says she would pick both boxes guaranteeing her that even though that would eliminate her chance to win a million dollars, she would still walk away with $100. While SC claims he would pick the opaque box and there would be a million dollars in it.
    I can’t help thinking SC’s rational is, at least in some part, based on his belief in the so-called many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI), that implies that all possible outcomes of a quantum measurement are physically realized in some “world” or universe. And in the hypothetical case involving the picking of boxes he would end up in the world where his opaque box contained a million dollars in it.

  8. Rob

    This was one of my favorite episodes!

    I really don’t understand the box problem. It was implied (at least I think it was) that picking both boxes is the “better” algorithm. Ok, perhaps there’s math that proves this? But to me it seems more important to describe exactly *how* the magical being makes his prediction. Is he looking into my brain and seeing what I personally am going to do in this situation? Or is he assuming that I’m a rational being and because I listen to podcasts like this one I will choose both boxes? Because I can’t think of a good reason why I would not choose the opaque box that will have $1 Million dollars in it. I’m very motivated to receive $1 Million dollars, no matter how “irrational” my choice might be (according to the math that I assume says “rationally I’m supposed to pick both boxes”.) – The MB seems to never be wrong, so it should know I will pick the opaque box and therefore get my $1 Million dollars. What would make the MB predict incorrectly for me – that I would *not* choose the single opaque box? Why is this choice not the right one?

    For the one-boxers, I wonder how your choice and this experiment would change if the MB were penalized a significant amount of money for predicting incorrectly. Would that alter the outcome for you?

  9. Philip Koop

    So why is an electron (say) not an “extended symbol” according to Elliott’s definition? I googled it but did not find a satisfactory answer.

  10. Philip Koop

    I love love love that you are a 1-boxer and Katie is a 2-boxer because it personifies the observation you made at the beginning: that science is metaphysics with a restricted epistemology. Or, if you prefer the ahistorical perspective, that metaphysics is a continuation of science by other epistemologies.

    How delightful! You should have Michael Strevens on your podcast. I wonder whether he is a 2-boxer?

  11. Philip Koop

    That said, in my opinion Katie is smuggling in induction via the back door. She says that it is logically impossible for a being to predict or cause her choice, and therefore it would be irrational to choose one box. But why does she think it is “logically” impossible? What premises has she started with and what is her chain of reasoning? I don’t believe it is really logic at all; I think it is experience: she has met many beings who would like to predict or cause her actions but none who could actually do so, and therefore she believes it is impossible. So she is really just prioritizing one set of empirical observations over another.

    I guess this observation must have been made a million times in this debate! Sorry, but I haven’t read the literature.

  12. Howard Gary

    Newcomb’s paradox, in the most general sense, involves questions of free will, determinism, choice, probability and rationality with no clear solution. But putting aside the philosophy and metaphysics it is possible to reformulate it into a purely mathematical problem, with an unambiguous solution, as explained in the video posted below:

    ‘Newcomb’s paradox| Famous Math Problems| NJ Wildberger’ (2013)

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aR5GYeZkgvY

  13. Chris Stephens

    Re: Newcomb’s paradox. I was slightly surprised that they seemed to discuss the version where everyone who picks one box is a millionaire and everyone who picks two boxes gets only $1,000. I wonder if Carroll would still be a one boxer if the case were described like this: suppose there is no “magic”. I’m the predictor, and I’m just good at reading people. I have to put the million or not in the opaque box after I meet you but before you choose. Suppose I’m right only 99% of the time. So, you watch me play the game with 1,000 other people and 99% of those who choose one box get million (but 1% get nothing) and 99% of those that choose both get only 1,000 (but 1% get 1 million plus a thousand).
    Assume there’s no backwards causality, no time travel, nothing “magical”. When it is your time to choose, the million is either in the box or not. Your choice doesn’t cause, in any way, whether the money appears in the box.

    Then, the puzzle is that the Principle of max. utility (based just on “evidence”) says to pick the one box: assuming your utility goes up in a typical way with money, you maximize your expected utility by going for one box.
    However, the principle of dominance says to pick both boxes. Dominance seems to apply because the money is already in the opaque box (or not) and so you’ll pick up the extra 1K either way. So two boxing seems to dominate one boxing in the decision theoretic sense.

    Here’s a variation. Suppose the back of the opaque box is transparent. I’m Sean Carroll’s friend. I can see whether the million is in the opaque box or not, just before Sean chooses. Either way, I’m going to tell him to take both boxes! Otherwise, he’s turning down an extra 1K.

    So, it looks like one should use the Principle of Maximizing “Causal” expected utilities – in that case, you can reconcile dominance with rational way to make decisions.

    So, I’m with Katie. In this case, the puzzle is set up to reward irrationality. But the rational thing to do is to take both boxes.

  14. Jose Castro

    Loved the playful tone of this dialogue. Kattie Elliot definitely scored some points with “Is he a friend of yours?” and “The saddest thing I’ve ever heard.” So many nuggets of information, so many topics, and so many comments! I’ll just mention two:

    1. Stochastic processes definitely are epistemic, are they also real? that’s a question beyond our capacity to figure out, in my humble opinion. To me, a stochastic process is one that under exactly the same state may evolve to more than one other possible subsequent state, so it depends on what we define the state to be. If we are presentists and the state is “The Present”, then it may be that it’s stochastic, but if we are eternalists then it’s impossible: the state is all spacetime (including past, present, and future) and this state uniquely identifies the position of each point. Now is that distinction useful? probably not, :D.

    2. Definitely a one-boxer. the two boxers ignore the information that we know that the genie knows my decision in advance. If we accept this premise then the implication goes from my action to the genie’s decision, and not temporarily (remember, he knows the future).

    I have to select the action that maximizes the money the genie will give me.

    This problem reminds me A LOT of medieval scholastic philosophers talking about predestination, god’s omniscience (the genie), and free will. I hope I’m not breaking the rules, but for anyone interested, I would very highly recommend Peter Adamson’s podcast, History of Philosophy without any gaps. episode 276: “Back to the Future: Foreknowledge and Predestination.” You’ll be surprised at how modern scholastic philosophers sound, and how their concepts are almost on a one-to-one mapping with the modern terminology.

  15. Howard Gary

    One important thing about Newcomb’s paradox is that in most versions the premises are intentionally left somewhat ambiguous. it’s never clearly stated how the oracle gets the information he needs to make his predictions, or exactly how accurate those predictions are. So, in a very general sense, whether you’re a one-boxer or a two-boxer more or less comes down to your belief that there are laws that govern the Universe, and that those laws are predictable. If you’re a one-boxer you most likely believe such laws exist and they are predictable. On the other hand, if you’re a two-boxer, you most likely believe that no such laws exist, or even if they do exist there not predictable. Great paradox on so many different levels!

  16. John F. Carr

    I was disappointed in middle school when I picked up a book that promised to tell me what would happen if an irresistable force met an immovable object. The book said the hypothetical was impossible. It was not a paradox. There was no answer.

    I feel like some of the thought experiments are impossible in ways that are essential and not merely the result of informal formulation of something that could be pinned down.

    On counterfactuals and causality, the universe doesn’t work in a way that allows you to only change the aim of a rock so it doesn’t hit a window. If you hold all else including the past constant then the change in the rock’s position or momentum is discontinuous. Our world conserves momentum and doesn’t allow rocks to teleport.

    Back in the 1990s a meteorologist told me about a problem with weather models. Scientists would feed observations into the computer and say “go”. The model would forecast waves rippling out from observation points. Discrete, imprecise observations represent an impossible state. The waves were a result of the model relaxing from a physically impossible configuration to a physically possible configuration.

    If you start teleporting rocks or winking the window out of existence for a moment you have broken the world like the bad observations broke the weather model.

    If you define the laws of nature as “the entire future state of the universe” you run into a cousin of the the halting problem and Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. An arbitrarily complex system can not contain a complete model of itself. If there is not a simpler representation than “the entire future state is this”, laws of nature do not exist.

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